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The psychology of self is the study of either the cognitive, conative or affective representation of one's identity or the subject of experience. The earliest formulation of the self in modern psychology derived from the distinction between the self as ''I,'' the subjective knower, and the self as ''Me'', the object that is known.〔James, W. (1891). ''The Principles of Psychology, Vol.1.'' Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1891)〕 Current views of the self in psychology position the self as playing an integral part in human motivation, cognition, affect, and social identity.〔Sedikides, C. & Spencer, S. J. (Eds.) (2007). ''The Self''. New York: Psychology Press〕 It may be the case that we can now usefully attempt to ground experience of self in a neural process with cognitive consequences, which will give us insight into the elements of which the complex multiply situated selves of modern identity are composed. The self has many facets that help make up integral parts of it, such as self-awareness, self-esteem, self-knowledge, and self-perception. All parts of the self enable people to alter, change, add, and modify aspects of themselves in order to gain social acceptance in society. “Probably the best account of the origins of selfhood is that the self comes into being at the interface between the inner biological processes of the human body and the sociocultural network to which the person belongs.” 〔Baumeister, Roy F., and Brad J. Bushman. "The Self." Social Psychology and Human Nature. 2nd ed. Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning, 2011. 57-96. Print.〕 ==Kohut's formulation== (詳細はnarcissistic perfection:'' 1) a system of ambitions and, 2) a system of ideals.'' Kohut called the pole of ambitions the ''narcissistic self'' (later, the ''grandiose self''〔H. Kohut (1971), ''The Analysis of the Self.'' New York: International Universities Press〕), while the pole of ideals was designated the ''idealized parental imago''. According to Kohut, these poles of the self represented natural progressions in the psychic life of infants and toddlers. Kohut argued that when the child's ambitions and exhibitionistic strivings were chronically frustrated, arrests in the grandiose self led to the preservation of a false, expansive sense of self that could manifest outwardly in the visible grandiosity of the frank narcissist, or remain hidden from view, unless discovered in a narcissistic therapeutic transference (or ''selfobject transference'') that would expose these primitive grandiose fantasies and strivings. Kohut termed this form of transference a ''mirror transference''. In this transference, the strivings of the grandiose self are mobilized and the patient attempts to use the therapist to gratify these strivings. Kohut proposed that arrests in the pole of ideals occurred when the child suffered chronic and excessive disappointment over the failings of early idealized figures. Deficits in the pole of ideals were associated with the development of an idealizing transference to the therapist who becomes associated with the patient's primitive fantasies of omnipotent parental perfection. Kohut believed that narcissistic injuries were inevitable and, in any case, necessary to temper ambitions and ideals with realism through the experience of more manageable frustrations and disappointments. It was the chronicity and lack of recovery from these injuries (arising from a number of possible causes) that he regarded as central to the preservation of primitive self systems untempered by realism. According to the 1984 book, ''How Does Analysis Cure'',〔A. Goldberg and P. Stepansky (Eds.), ''How Does Analysis Cure'', Chicago: University of Chicago Press〕 Kohut's observation of patients led him to propose two additional forms of transference associated with self deficits: ''1) the twinship and, 2) the merger transference''. In his later years, Kohut believed that selfobject needs were both present and quite varied in normal individuals, as well as in narcissistic individuals. To be clear, selfobjects are not external persons. Kohut and Wolf, 1978〔"Disorders of the Self and Their Treatment", ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis'', 59: 413-425〕 explain: ''"Self objects are objects which we experience as part of our self; the expected control over them is, therefore, closer to the concept of control which a grownup expects to have over his own body and mind than to the concept of control which he expects to have over others. (p.413)"'' Kohut's notion of the self can be difficult to grasp because it is experience-distant, although it is posited based upon experience-near observation of the therapeutic transference. Kohut relied heavily on empathy as a method of observation. Specifically, the clinician's observations of his or her own feelings in the transference help the clinician see things from the subjective view of the patient—to experience the world in ways that are closer to the way the patient experiences it. (note: Kohut did not regard empathy as curative. Empathy is a method of observation). 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「psychology of self」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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